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It takes many good deeds to build a good reputation, and only one bad one to lose it.
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INTRODUCTION
Reputation is crucial in many arenas, and judging is no exception. A judge with a
good reputation will enjoy the esteem of his friends and colleagues and may have chances
for advancement to higher courts. If particularly well-known, he or she will have a
legacy that endures long after death, as do those of Coke, Blackstone and Holmes. A
judiciary that operates effectively will earn respect within its own political system and
internationally, and may become a model for other countries, providing opportunities for
travel and exchange for judges. A judiciary with a poor reputation, in contrast, will find
itself starved of both resources and respect.
Despite the sense that reputation is important, we know very little about how
judicial reputation is produced. We understand that some judges and judiciaries are
viewed as successful and others are not, but we do not really have any theories about how
reputation is developed and sustained. In this article, we use economic analysis to provide
a theory of judicial reputation, and provide preliminary evidence of the institutional
consequences from a range of legal systems.
We define reputation in some depth below, treating it as the aggregate of
judgements used to predict future performance. 1 The object of our analysis is how
reputation is formed or produced, the mechanisms by which reputation is achieved and
the institutional incentives that reinforce or harm judicial reputation. We do not discuss
whether or not reputation is a good or a bad thing, whether individual reputation is better
or worse than group reputation, or whether individual visibility and exposition enhances
creativity and legal change in a more appropriate way than a group-focused professional
environment. Nor is our analysis normative. Our concern in this paper is to understand
how different institutional configurations facilitate different modes of producing
reputation, with impact on professional norms and the position of judges in society.
Judicial reputation plays two important roles. First, it conveys information to the
uninformed general public about the quality of the judiciary (more generally, about the
legal system) as perceived by the relevant audiences. Second, reputation fosters esteem
for the profession and for the individual judge, both self-esteem and esteem in the eyes of
others. Esteem of others is a predicate to better payoffs both in terms of material
resources available to the judiciary as well as insulation from other political actors who
might expropriate such resources. We can think of self-esteem as a form of intrinsic
motivation, and resource-based motives as extrinsic motivation.
The reputation of the judiciary, individually or as a whole, determines its status in
any given society and its ability to compete effectively for resources within the
government. Therefore a reputation for high quality of judicial performance or of the
legal system in general is important. We do not specify a universal reputation function for
judges, and recognize that judges in different systems will seek reputations for different
qualities—such as predictability, wisdom, and efficiency—that might not be valued in
other systems. In this sense we treat reputation as instrumental toward some other end
for which we use the generic term “judicial quality.” This quality might be assessed
formalistically (judges should apply and interpret the law correctly according to the will
of the legislator), authoritatively (judges should be the authority for excellence in
lawmaking), or from an agency perspective (judges should maximize the welfare of the
1

See below, Sec. I for a more extended discussion.

Garoupa and Ginsburg, Reputation p. 3
principal, presumably society as a whole). Whatever the definition of judicial quality in a
particular legal system, reputation emerges as a relevant factor and plays an important
role.
We make three claims. First, reputation matters. Virtually every theory of judicial
power is dependent, ultimately, on perceptions of judges, who famously lack the purse or
the sword. Only if judges have a reputation for high quality will their decisions be
respected and produce compliance. Without compliance, judges cannot accomplish their
social functions of resolving disputes, articulating rules, and serving as vehicles for social
control. 2 Thus, reputation is essential from an instrumental perspective.
Our second claim is that reputation can be divided into individual and collective
components. Individual reputation provides information about individual performance
whereas collective reputation provides information about the quality of the judiciary in
general. At the same time, each member of an institution cares about his individual
reputation, but also about the reputation of the group as a whole (establishing and shaping
the character, attributes and nature of the group). Collective reputation determines the
status of the judiciary, but individual reputation influences the judge’s relative perception
vis-à-vis their fellow judges. Therefore, not all reputation building is necessarily socially
beneficial; it is possible that some internal status dynamic operates differently than what
would be socially optimal.
The bifurcated nature of reputation creates interesting institutional challenges,
which we analyze below using the economic concept of team production. 3 If judicial
performance were essentially individual and the quality of the judiciary could be easily
disaggregated into the individual contributions, individual reputation should prevail as
the most important mechanism to provide information. But crucially, it is often difficult
to monitor separate individual contributions since judicial production entails to some
extent non-separable elements. Hence, information about aggregate performance of the
judiciary is also relevant. Consequently, investments into the different components of
reputation are important to achieve the adequate balance of information required by a
specific society, and so an important task of institutional design is to provide optimal
incentives for production of reputation.
Third, different legal systems configure institutions in different ways in order to
address the problem of information and reputation. The classical understandings of the
common law and civil law judiciaries can be seen as sets of linked institutions that are
mutually supportive in addressing the problem of information and reputation. We
describe these institutions from the perspective of information and reputation, and explain
how they inter-relate. Judiciaries that emphasize collective reputation utilize institutions
to limit publicly available information about the performance of the individual judge.

2

Shapiro M 1981 Courts, A Comparative and Political Analysis University of Chicago Press; Shapiro, M
1995 ‘The United States’, in Tate CN and Vallinder T (eds), The Global Expansion of Judicial Power
making the point that only reputable courts can defend rights from infringements by the majority.
3

The foundational papers on team production include Alchian AA and Demsetz H 1972 ‘Production,
Information Costs and Economic Organization’ 62 American Economic Review 777; Holmstrom B 1982
Moral Hazard in Teams 13 Bell Journal of Economics 324; Aoki M 1994 ‘The Contingent Governance of
Teams: Analysis of Institutional Complementarities 35 International Economic Review 657; Rajan RG and
Zingales L 1998 ‘Power in the Theory of the Firm’ 113 Quarterly Journal of Economics 387.
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Those that emphasize individual reputation, on the other hand, facilitate the disclosure of
such information. In both cases the disclosure or non-disclosure of private information
about individual performance reinforces the kind of reputation that prevails in the judicial
system.
Our discussion of institutional arrangements is fundamentally positive. We
explain how institutions favor the production of individual and collective information.
Presumably there is an optimal mix that can vary across jurisdictions depending on local
preferences, historical events that determine the allocation of human capital, and political
economy considerations. Although from an economic perspective, we might expect that
information about individual performance would always be valuable to the relevant
audiences (other judges, lawyers, economic and political agents, and general public), it
could well be that the political context makes disclosure of information on individual
performance harmful. For example, a judiciary that is concerned about threats to its
independence may prefer to mask individual judicial contributions out of concern that
politicians may seek to remove judges who decide cases against them.
Our effort is consistent with a recent body of work in comparative law that looks
at the actual institutional structures of different legal systems. 4 This approach contrasts
with the deductive approach that starts with legal origins and assumes that ancient
institutional distinctions are enduring and consequential. 5 We believe that institutions
matter, but also emphasize that institutional structures can change over time, and suggest
that minor institutional reforms can have severe and unintended consequences on the
production of reputation. This perspective, we argue, is more helpful to understand
judicial behavior than the simple categorization of legal origins.
Our article is organized as follows. Part I lays out why reputation matters; Parts II
and III describes our theory, treating judicial reputation from the perspective of the
economics of team production. Part IV identifies how particular institutions affect
reputation, and suggests that institutional configurations fall into two clusters, roughly
but not exclusively corresponding to the common law and civil law judicial systems. The
former system, we find, favors the production of individual reputation and the latter
collective reputation. Part V suggests lessons for reform.
I. WHY REPUTATION MATTERS
To begin, we should define what reputation is with some precision. As mentioned
above, we think of reputation of any particular agent as the aggregate of private

4

For a similar approach, see Hadfield G 2008 ‘The Levers of Legal Design: Institutional Determinants of
the Quality of Law’ 36 Journal of Comparative Economics 43 ; Hadfield G forthcoming 2009 ‘The Quality
of Law in Civil Code and Common Law Regimes: Judicial Incentives, Legal Human Capital and the
Evolution of Law’ Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization.

5

The vast literature on legal origins is associated with La Porta R, Lopez de Silanes F, Shleifer A and
Vishny RW 1998 ‘Law and Finance’ 106 Journal of Political Economy 1113 ; La Porta R, Lopez-deSilanes F, Shleifer A and Vishny RW 1997 ‘Legal Determinants of External Finance’ 52 Journal of
Finance 1131 ; Djankov S, La Porta R, Lopez-De-Silanes F and Shleifer A 2003 ‘Courts’ 118 Quarterly
Journal of Economics 453; La Porta R, Lopez de Silanes F, Pop-Eleches C and Shleifer A 2004 ‘Judicial
Balances and Checks’ 112 Journal of Political Economy 445.
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judgments of past behavior used to predict of future performance. 6
This involves
information on past performance, as well as signals given by the agent herself. It is
possible, but not at all necessary, to imagine that reputation includes an esteem
component, so that reputation is granted on the basis of some interdependent production
function by a particular audience. Assessment of reputation may be based on public
information or private information, depending who is the relevant audience.
In particular, individual reputation conveys information about the individual
performance of a given judge whereas collective reputation reveals information about the
general quality of the judiciary. Due to the non-separable nature of judicial production,
collective reputation is not simply the aggregation of individual reputations. If it were,
then collective reputation would be trivial. In other words, collective information may
differ from the sum of assessments about individual performance. Notice that our
distinction is not merely explained by cognitive limitations, such as the idea that the
general public cannot recall the individual names of all judges and therefore uses the
perception of an average performance as a proxy. Our distinction is driven by our
understanding of judicial production as team work. Judges produce the law collectively
and so it is difficult to determine whether any individual decision results from qualities of
the individual judge or the judiciary as a whole.
Judicial reputation matters. It matters from a social welfare perspective because it
provides information and signals about individual judges and the general quality of the
judiciary, thus reducing search costs for those who demand court services. Information
about the judiciary matters for legal certainty, the rule of law, anticipated enforcement of
property rights, and indirectly for investment and economic growth.
Judges, like most everyone, care about their reputation to the extent that
reputation is an important social and economic asset. 7 They care about their monetary
payoffs, and therefore reputation is important to the extent that those monetary payoffs
vary with reputation. If information about individual performance determines salaries,
then judges care about individual reputation. If information about collective performance
and quality of the judiciary determines salaries, then judges change their behavior
accordingly.
6

Miller GD 2003 ‘Hypotheses on Reputation: Alliance Choices and the Shadow of the Past’ 12 Security
Studies at 40–78.
7

On judicial individual preferences, see Posner R 1993 ‘What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The
Same Thing as Everybody Else)’ 3 Supreme Court Economic Review1; Posner R 2005 ‘Judicial Behavior
and Performance: An Economic Approach’ 32 Florida State University Law Review 1259; Posner R 2006
‘The Role of the Judge in the Twenty-First Century’ 86 Boston University Law Review 1049 and Posner R
2008 How Judges Think Harvard University Press. See also Easterbrook FH ‘What’s So Special About
Judges?’ 1990 61 University of Colorado Law Review773; Cohen M 1991 ‘Explaining Judicial Behavior or
What’s “Unconstitutional” about the Sentencing Commission?’ 7 Journal of Law, Economics, and
Organization 183 ; Cohen M 1996 ‘The Motives for Judges: Empirical Evidence from Antitrust Suits’ 12
International Review of Law and Economics 13; Simon D ‘A Psychological Model of Judicial Decision’ 30
Rutgers Law Journal 1; Schauer F 2000 ‘Incentives, Reputation, and the Inglorious Determinants of
Judicial Behavior’ 68 University of Cincinnati Law Review615; Foxall GR 2004 ‘What Judges Maximize:
Toward an Economic Psychology of the Judicial Utility Function’ 25 Liverpool Law Review 177; and
Guthrie C, Rachlinski JJ and Wistrich AJ 2007 ‘Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases’ 93
Cornell Law Review 1.For a different perspective, see Baum L 1994 ‘What Judges Want: Judges’ Goals
and Judicial Behavior’ 47 Political Research Quarterly 749 and Baum L 2006 Judges And Their Audiences
Princeton University Press.
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But judges also care about nonmonetary payoffs and in this respect reputation is
an important professional asset. Reputation is defined as a credible signal of high quality,
which allows judges to fulfill professional duties and achieve career goals. 8 Individual
and collective information conveyed to the relevant audience shape the ability of judges
to influence society. Hence consistency and conformity are important for individual
judges; following precedents guarantees their ability to shape the law in particular cases.
Reputation does not matter only for the welfare of an individual judge. The
reputation of the judiciary as a whole is dependent on the reputation of its component
judges. And the reputation of the courts as a whole is the crucial determinant in the
judiciary’s ability to accomplish its goals. Judicial decisions, after all, are not selfenforcing, and the courts famously lack the power of the purse or sword to implement
their decisions. 9 Judicial decisions require real-world institutions to take real actions to
ensure compliance.
There are a variety of theories as to why it is that real world actors obey the
pronouncements of courts. One traditional set of arguments focused on the legitimacy of
judicial decisions. Another set of arguments emphasized enforcement by other state
officials, but this only begged the question, for one must have an account of why other
officials have an incentive to obey courts. A third, increasingly important view sees
judicial decisions as facilitating coordination of parties’ expectations by providing focal
points. 10 In this view, parties obey the judges because they expect other parties to play
certain strategies in response to the court decision. But regardless of the theory as to why
judges are obeyed, reputation matters inasmuch the information it conveys is valuable. A
better reputation will be correlated with an increased likelihood of compliance, whether
the mechanism of compliance involved relies on legitimacy, on enforcement, or on
coordination. As judicial decisions are complied with, they will provide feedback in the
form of an improved reputation.
Recently, a former Chief Justice of Israel has explained in detail why individual
judges care about collective reputation and the extent to which it influences their
decisions. He identifies collective goals: the judiciary is in his view the “junior partner”
in the legislative process, in the sense of playing an important role in responsiveness to
change in social reality within the law; the judiciary is also the “senior partner” in the
creation and development of the common law, within the powers and limitations of the
legal system. In order to achieve these goals effectively as a collective, the judiciary
needs consistency and credibility. In his view even concurring opinions weaken the force
8

For the different possible goals of the judiciary, see Baum L 2004 The Puzzle of Judicial Behavior
University of Michigan Press and Robbennolt JK, MacCoun RJ and Darley JM, ‘Multiple Constraint
Satisfaction in Judging’ available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1133184. See also Ran Hirschl, Towards
Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism (2004) making
the point that extending the power of the judiciary (juristocracy) as a collective goal can only be achieved
with certain court reputation, for example, impartial adjudication at the eyes of the public,
9

‘The Federalist No. 78’ in Wright B ed 1961 at 461.

10

McAdams R 2005 ‘The Expressive Power of Adjudication’ 2005 University of Illinois Law Review 1043;
Ginsburg T and McAdams R ‘’ 2004 45 William and Mary Law Review 1229; Law DS 2009 ‘A Theory of
Judicial Review and Judicial Power’ 97 Georgetown Law Journal 723.
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of the judgment. But a robust collective reputation allows courts to make flawed
decisions occasionally since there is confidence in individual and collective
independence, fairness and impartiality. In sum, individual judges are confronted with
balancing the benefits of insisting on individual opinions, which may advance their
personal goals, versus the costs in terms of consistency and credibility, which may create
uncertainty within the legal system and hurts their prestige and ability to shape the law. 11
One can get a sense of how important reputation is by considering the situation of
judges in some developing countries. Despite a recent consensus that law plays a crucial
role in economic development, real-world reforms are difficult to implement, and we
have little evidence that billions of dollars of investment in improving judicial
performance has actually paid off. 12 In many countries, the judiciary has a reputation for
corruption. 13 In these environments, collective action has failed, and individual judges
seek to maximize their own wealth at the expense of their collective reputation. It is hard
to pin ones hopes for reform on institutions that have poor reputations to start out.
Reputation also plays an important role in the recruitment of judges. A more
reputable judicial system attracts candidates with higher levels of human capital.
Judiciaries with low reputations or reputations for corruption will attract the ill-qualified
and greedy. A lazy judiciary will attract lazy individuals. Even if a system has overcome
these problems, it is still the case that different reputation mechanisms might attract
different types of people. 14 Selection processes tend to reinforce the status quo, since the
new judges are interested in reinforcement of the reputation that attracted them to the
profession in the first place. 15
In short, we believe that reputation is a central quality of judiciaries that has
received too little treatment in the literature. Virtually every function for which societies
rely on the judiciary depends on the production of a reputation for high quality, impartial
and independent decision-making. Without reputation, judiciaries are doomed to
irrelevance.
II. A THEORY OF REPUTATION

11

See Barak A 2006 The Judge in Democracy Princeton University Press.

12

Carothers T 2006 Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: In Search of Knowledge Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace.
13

See, e.g., Buscaglia E 2000 ‘Judicial Corruption in Developing Countries: Its Causes and Economic
Consequences’ Essays in Public Policy Stanford University Hoover Institution Press at 24–29 (; Buscaglia
E 1997 ‘Judicial Corruption in Latin America’ Essays in Law and Economics Amsterdam Kluwer.
14

See Malleson K 2004 ‘Selecting Judges in the Era of Devolution and Human Rights’ in Le Sueur A ed
2004 Building The Uk’s New Supreme Court: National And Comparative Perspectives Oxford University
Press (making the point that a career judiciary in common law would create considerable adverse selection
by attracting less talent since the reputation for judicial independence would be reduced, even if
recruitment would be more transparent).
15
For example, if reputation is based on social diversity, judicial professionalism, political ideology, and
the size of case load, then we should expect judges to promote an agenda that reinforces those factors. See
Caldeira GA 1983 ‘On the Reputation of State Supreme Courts’ 5 Political Behaviour 83.
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Reputation can be divided into two components, individual and collective. Individual
reputation is related to the name recognition of each judge. 16 Collective reputation is
linked to the role the judiciary is perceived to have in any given society. Each and every
judge is affected by individual and by collective reputation and consequently cares about
both. Nevertheless, depending on incentives and the institutional framework, judges
might be more concerned with one or the other in different societies.
Individual reputation-building is fundamentally an activity that each judge must
accomplish on his or her own, while collective reputation-building is the product of teamwork. Furthermore, it is not always the case that effort allocated to individual reputation
building enhances collective reputation and vice-versa. In fact, in many circumstances
these two goals conflict (although in others they do not). For example, individual
reputation might encourage each judge has to differentiate herself from other judges;
excessive differentiation across the bench might seriously undermine collective
reputation. High variance in the performance of individual judges can hurt the reputation
of the judiciary as a whole.
Judges allocate effort between building individual and collective reputations as a
response to incentives and the institutional environment. For example, a judge might have
to decide between advancing his or her own preferences (hence building individual
reputation for a certain profile) or conforming with the general preferences of his or her
colleagues (hence promoting collective reputation for consensus). In many
circumstances, a particular effort can enhance both individual and collective reputation at
the same time. But in many other circumstances, by investing more in building individual
reputation, a judge contributes less to building collective reputation. In these
circumstances each judge has to make a choice as to which type of reputation to invest in.
Choices are influenced by incentives, which in turn are established by different actors.
These actors can be considered principals on whose behalf the judiciary works.
Collective reputation is essentially determined by external mechanisms. It reflects
the views of society or public opinion in general toward the judiciary, but also by how the
interests of the relevant particular constituencies with power over the courts are
addressed. These constituencies might include the bar, other branches of government,
political parties and others, depending on the institutional environment of courts.
Collective reputation shapes the social and political influence of the judiciary as a whole,
and consequently has monetary and non-monetary implications for the welfare of the
judges. For example, collective reputation may impact the overall judicial budget,
salaries, pensions, and other perks available to the judiciary, as well the level of social
16

Previous work on individual reputation includes Miceli TJ and Cosgel MM 1994 ‘Reputation and
Judicial Decision-Making’ 23 Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization 31 (showing that
individual reputation can both restrain judicial discretion, but also inspire it if future judges are expected to
be persuaded by a decision and follow it, thereby enhancing the authoring judge's reputation); Harnay S and
Marciano A 2003 ‘Judicial Conformity versus Dissidence: An Economic Analysis of Judicial Precedent’
2003 23 International Review of Law and Economics 405 (explaining that an individual decision made by a
judge does not only reflect his personal preferences about a case but also the expected response of the
judicial community to the decision); Levy G 2005 ‘Careerist Judges’ 36 RAND Journal of Economics 275
(showing that the possibility of appeal generates an equilibrium where careerist judges tend to be creative
due to the assumption that contradicting previous decisions is a signal of ability and increases individual
reputation; at the same time, there is an aversion to reversals because they reduce reputation).
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prestige and overall working conditions in the courts. In other words, collective
reputation determines the size of the pie to be divided among individual judges.
Individual reputation is established by external mechanisms (such as academic
commentators, the bar and political actors) but also by internal mechanisms (such as peer
evaluation by other judges or a judicial council). Individual reputation, as established by
these internal mechanisms, determines the share each judge gets of the pie while the
outside appraisal by relevant external constituencies determines potential supplementary
payoffs obtained individually. The balance between external and internal mechanisms
shapes individual reputation building. 17
In our analysis, we assume that reputation is a noiseless signal of judicial quality,
however defined. (In information theory, noise refers to distortion in the accuracy of the
received signal, so that a noiseless signal is one that provides accurateinformation about
reputation).
Reputation provides information about individual and collective
performance. Although in the real world, reputations are noisy, we make the simplifying
assumption that reputation maps accurately onto judicial quality. This assumption is not
strictly speaking necessary for our analysis—all we need to assume is that noise does not
vary systematically across the institutional structures that we analyze. Nevertheless, we
set aside noise in the present discussion. This means we need not consider how
reputation dissipates after it is acquired. In the real world, the fact that reputation is noisy
means that relevant constituencies may continue to accord the judiciary with status, even
after behavior changes. Reputations in the real world are sticky, a feature which
heightens the importance of investing in reputation and makes the problems we discuss
even more salient.
III. JUDICIAL REPUTATION AS A PROBLEM OF TEAM PRODUCTION
The legal system and courts are complex, and the role of judges is multifaceted. In
theory, one might be able to produce a measure or a set of appropriate measures of
performance to evaluate the contribution of an individual judge to each case or decision.
However, when we look at the quality of the legal system as a whole, in terms of uniform
application and enforcement of the law, conflict resolution, and norm-articulation, the
marginal contribution of each judge cannot be perfectly determined. In other words,
measuring individual judicial productivity might be possible in individual cases but from
an aggregate perspective is quite complicated, due to significant interdependencies in
production.
We can say that the output produced by each judge has an individual component
reflected in each case decided, and a non-separable component that contributes to the
overall quality of the court system. 18 This is neatly captured by Ronald Dworkin in his
17

For the general public, see for example Caldeira GA 1986 ‘Neither the Purse nor the Sword: Confidence
in the Supreme Court’ 80 American Political Science Review 1210 and Caldeira GA and Gibson JL 1992
‘The Etiology of Public Support for the Supreme Court’ 36 American Journal of Political Science 635; for
administrative bodies and government audiences, see W. N. Eskridge WN 1993 ‘The Judicial Review
Game’ 88 Northwestern University Law Review 382; Eskridge WN and Ferejohn JA 1992 ‘The Article I,
Section 7 Game’ 80 Georgetown Law Journal 523; and Ferejohn JA and Weingast BR 1992 ‘A Positive
Theory of Statutory Interpretation’ 12 International Review of Law and Economics 263; for the larger law
school audience, see Schauer above note 7.

18
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description of judicial production as co-authorship in a chain novel. 19 The non-separable
nature of a portion of judicial output is aggravated by the specific human capital required
to perform judicial work. 20 The characteristics of the job require specific knowledge and
training in order to achieve the desired understanding of the law. Therefore any
assessment concerning individual output requires an identical or similar stock of specific
human capital. The most important beneficiaries of a high quality legal system, the
general public, lack the knowledge and the sophistication to make such assessment at the
individual level. Generally speaking, the public is more likely to have an overall
perception of the court system than a precise assessment of each member of the judiciary.
As a consequence of the non-separable nature of the output coupled with the need
for specific human capital, the judiciary operates as a team, and therefore every member
of the judiciary benefits from a collective reputation. Individual reputation matters to the
extent that different constituencies look at the individual component of the output.
Nevertheless, since each judge operates within a court system with a given quality,
collective reputation necessarily matters as well. The balance between these two will
depend on institutional attributes and incentives. Significantly, as in any team,
coordination issues and collective action problems arise. How these problems are
addressed by a given legal system generates its specific configuration and the balance
between individual and collective reputation.
Standard economic theory of teams considers two solutions, usually called ex ante
and ex post sharing rules (both in reference to output production by the team). We
explain them in the context of the judiciary; ex ante sharing rules correspond to our
collective reputation model and ex post sharing rules correspond to our individual
reputation model.
Ex Ante Sharing Rules: Collective Reputation Only
One solution to problems of team production is to rely on ex ante sharing rules, which in
our context would mean that each judge earns an equal share of reputation. This implies
a judiciary that is reliant solely on collective reputation. Given the non-separable nature
of output and the need for specific human capital, collective reputation is necessarily part
of the payoff function. However, an emphasis on collective reputation only naturally
raises concerns with shirking, the most common problem with ex ante sharing rules.
Judges may be driven to reduce their own effort in reputation-building by free-riding on
their peers. The argument cuts two ways. First, lazy judges will benefit from collective
reputation and may therefore appropriate surplus reputation for which they did not
contribute. Second, the costs of undermining reputation are disseminated across the
judiciary.
Another important aspect of ex ante sharing rules that is implicated in an
emphasis only on collective reputation is that it also generates a collective action problem
concerning monitoring or coordination mechanisms to reduce the free-riding problem. In
the absence of specialized actors or an intermediate hierarchy (perhaps in a body such as
a judicial council) to internalize these coordination issues, individual judges have no
incentive to unilaterally invest time and resources in detecting lazy judges. Hence, not
19

See Dworkin R 1982 ‘Law as Interpretation’ 60 Texas Law Review 527.
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only does shirking take place, but detection and punishment of shirking is very
infrequent.
Collective reputation only configures a legal system with low powered incentives
for individual judges. The idea of low powered incentives in the literature on transaction
cost economics refers to systems of compensation in which individuals do not share in
the gains from particular transactions, while high powered incentives allow individuals to
benefit from their marginal contribution. 21 In judiciaries without information about
individual judicial performance, judges can free-ride and shirk. Ex ante sharing rules only
are thus an insufficient solution to the problem.
Ex Post Sharing Rules: Individual Reputation Only
Implementing an institutional design that relies on ex post sharing rules would involve, in
this context, a judiciary totally reliant on individual reputation. An ex post allocation of
rewards will likely induce opportunistic rent-seeking, as judges will invest time and effort
to grab a larger share of resources available to the judiciary and enhance their individual
reputation. This waste of time and effort is damaging given the partially non-separable
nature of judicial output. That is, relying only on ex post rewards will induce judges to
expend more effort on the separable component of output and less effort on the nonseparable components. It seems clear that a judicial system solely based on individual
reputation could reduce shirking but would become dysfunctional in other ways.
This framework may suggest why it is that no judiciary of which we are aware
seeks to pay judges exclusively at a rate equivalent to their marginal output. Salaries tend
to be identical at each level of the judicial hierarchy in all legal systems. This is not
simply a matter of administrative convenience, but an implicit recognition that
differentiated salaries may discourage investment in those activities that tend to
contribute to collective reputation. 22
To provide a concrete illustration, suppose managers of the judicial system
decided to try to improve efficiency by paying judges on the basis of the number of cases
they decide. This could lead judges to seek out the easiest cases, or to spend less time
deciding any individual case. While many individual judges would improve their
reputations for efficiency, the difficult cases would not be handled well, and overall
quality could decline. This in turn would affect the reputation of the judiciary as a whole.
A legal system that relies on individual reputation only promotes information
about individual judges and develops collective reputation as a mere aggregation of
individual reputations. This is a legal system that operates with high powered
incentives. 23 However, due to the nature of team production, high powered incentives
might be inefficient and reduce the appropriate investment in the non-separable
component of judicial production.
Need for Accountability
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Either pure mechanism using only ex ante or ex post sharing rules creates serious
problems. Therefore, a superior approach is to utilize a combination of both ex ante and
ex post sharing rules, so as to induce production of both collective and individual
reputation. However, the co-existence of both modes might not be enough to curtail the
problems of shirking and rent-seeking that we have identified, given the non-separable
nature of output and the specific human capital inherent to the judiciary. Furthermore,
external constraints (such as future job opportunities or political interference) might
shape incentives one way or the other.
Some palliatives might be necessary to mitigate these problems. In many
situations, ex ante and ex post sharing rules could conflict in a serious way. For
example, sometimes a judge may be able to maximize their own reputation by deciding a
particular case in a manner that conflicts with the rule of law, harming the reputation of
the judiciary as a whole.
In order to solve these problems and conflicts, we import here the concept of a
“mediating hierarchy” as developed by Blair and Stout.24 The essence of a mediating
hierarchy is that members give up important rights to a third party in a horizontal
interaction. The quality of the horizontal monitoring depends on evidence, signals and
susceptibility to group punishment, but it avoids the problem posed by a vertical
hierarchy, that of curtailing independence of agents. Furthermore, a vertical hierarchy is
not an ideal solution when individual monitoring is very costly and severe punishment is
difficult (since individual punishment presupposes separable output).
In our view, a judicial council could play the role of a mediating hierarchy.
Judicial councils are institutions that have responsibility for selecting, training, and in
some systems, disciplining judges. 25 They can help ensure that the judiciary achieves a
balance between collective and individual reputation through soft policies rather than as a
full-fledged supervisor. In particular, the judicial council can encourage the development
of professional norms and, through careful selection processes, team member attributes
that enhance both the collective and individual reputation of the judiciary.
A deficient design of a mediating hierarchy can nevertheless lead us to exacerbate
rather than reduce many of the problems we have identified. Furthermore, there are
important issues that a mediating hierarchy cannot fully resolve. One controversial issue
is the adequate relationship between the judiciary and other branches of government. The
judicialization of public policies may serve to enhance both collective reputation and
individual reputation. However, it may unleash countervailing forces that target the
collective reputation of the judiciary, leading to politicization of the judiciary. Excessive
media exposure (a form of accountability) could, for example, make time and effort into
building individual and collective reputation better applied if judges actively engage in
judicializing public policies. 26 Constitutional safeguards against “judicial government” of
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public policy become then more relevant in order to limit judicial activism. A serious
political problem may occur when one branch of government (the judiciary or the
executive) can raise its relative status in the public eyes by lowering the relative status of
the other branches, necessarily generating important institutional conflicts.
At the same time, the linkage between reputational incentives and accountability
also depends on the interaction of other relevant institutional characteristics. For
example, when the control mechanisms exercised by senior judges weaken, a shift from
collective to individual reputation building could emerge as the most powerful, if not the
only available mechanism, to enhance accountability. In other cases, where the judiciary
is subject to the external influence from multiple sources (for example, the ECJ where
rewards can come from multiple constituencies such as EU institutions and bodies,
national governments, national judiciaries), conflictive goals could in fact impede an
effective mediating hierarchy.
A second important issue is known in the economics literature as the relevance of
team boundaries. It is important for team production that the members of the team, and
only the members of the team, are responsible for observable output. It could be argued
that the boundaries of the judiciary are reasonably well-defined and therefore this is not a
problem in this context. However, the non-separable part of the output (for example, the
quality of the court system) is also affected by agents who are not members of the
judiciary and in many circumstances are not even under the control of the judiciary, such
as clerks, lawyers, and government officials responsible for enforcement. Since the nonseparable part of the judicial output is the determinant of collective reputation, serious
conflicts are likely to emerge between the mediating hierarchy and other branches or
bodies of government with respect to control over these other agents.
IV. COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
In every legal system, individual and collective judicial reputations and information are
important. However the relative degree of importance varies not only across legal
families, but even within the same legal family. If we look at the US federal judiciary, for
example, individual reputation seems to matter a great deal. The Supreme Court is
identified with the name of the Chief Justice (such as Warren, Rehnquist or Roberts) and
the great judges of the past are heroes, such as Marshall, Brandeis, and Holmes.
Newspapers discuss how individual justices vote in particular cases and quote from
dissents. Federal judges give talks to the public and write books advancing their views on
important issues, and the appointment mechanism includes Senate confirmation hearings
in which individual candidates to the federal courts have to expose their views.
Academics study the judicial contribution of individual justices in detail,27 and they are
the subject of popular biographies. 28 There seems to be a significant production of
individual information and a serious assessment of individual performance.
In France, Japan and Germany, in contrast, most people have no idea of the
identity of the Chief Justice, much less the other justices of the Supreme Court;
newspapers very rarely report on dissenting views across the bench; justices usually
27
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avoid exposure and contact with public opinion in general; and very few judges get to be
known by the public in general. 29 If justice is blind, judges are anonymous. In these legal
systems, information about individual performance seems to be intentionally
underplayed, if not systematically hidden from the general public. 30
In the United Kingdom, the Law Lords enjoy high levels of prestige but most
members of the public do not know the names of these twelve people (or even their
number) except in rare instances when controversial cases draw media attention (such as
the Pinochet case in the late 90s). 31 Many judges become known by the public only if
they head specific inquiries into practices or decisions by the government. 32
Although the political stakes of the European Court of Justice would seem to
provide opportunities for individual reputation building, this is another example of a
court that forcefully pursues collective reputation and avoids any kind of individual focus
on a single judge. Public unanimity is the norm and there are no dissenting opinions.
There is a very powerful reason for this. The judges appointed to the European Court of
Justice defend the need for secrecy and unanimity because their appointments are only
for six-year renewable terms and not life: if they were to sign separate opinions, member
states could check whether their judges were voting for or against the national interest
29
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and refuse to reappoint judges who did not vote appropriately, thereby compromising
their independence. 33 This is an excellent example of how provision of individual
information can be detrimental.
It is clear that in some legal systems collective reputation prevails over individual
reputation whereas in other legal systems the opposite takes place; some legal systems
pursue individual performance whereas other prefer to limit information about individual
performance and rely more on collective assessment. 34 These differences are very
important at two levels. First, they respond to different incentives and organizational
attributes within a complex institutional arrangement. Second, they ought to be seriously
considered in designing legal reforms, especially in an era when most legal systems are
experiencing increased judicialization of public policies. This section discusses some of
the different institutional structures that condition the development of judicial reputation.
We do not provide a theory of why these institutional structures exist, but rather focus in
this paper on the contribution of institutional structure to disclosure of information and
reputation building. For example, we do not discuss the rationale for the existence of an
appeal system (presumably error correction), but rather examine how the different
designs of an appeal system enhance individual versus collective reputation or provides
individual versus collective information.
A. Career vs. Recognition Judiciary
One way of contrasting different types of judicial structures is to distinguish the “career”
from “recognition” judiciaries. 35 The career system involves judges entering a judicial
bureaucracy at a young age, and spending an entire career as a judge. 36 The recognition
system appoints judges later in life, usually after the candidate has established themselves
as an excellent candidate. It involves fewer opportunities for promotion.
Judicial appointments based on individual recognition typically involve
appointing a candidate relatively late in life on the basis of a reputation that has already
been established. The appointment is based on the individual reputation of the candidate,
as assessed by the relevant constituency, using an external mechanism outside the
judiciary. For example, in the United States, the President appoints federal judges, with
the advice and consent of the Senate, after the candidates have developed a stellar
reputation in other spheres. The external mechanism helps to compensate for the absence
33
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of a vertical hierarchy in the judiciary, which decreases the incentives to comply with
rigid professional norms. Therefore, the appointment system by external agents dilutes
the collective identity of the judiciary. Finally, the lack of a promotion system seriously
weakens internal mechanisms of control. Therefore in recognition judiciaries, individual
reputation as perceived by external mechanisms is the dominant factor in judicial
appointments.
In contrast, a career judiciary is selected and promoted based on internal judicial
assessments of individual merit. Relatively little information is available to the public
about judges, but the judiciary itself develops and uses internal performance measures to
make promotion decisions. Compliance with internal mechanisms makes collective
reputation much more important. The credibility of a given judge does not depend on her
individual merits but on the reputation of the entire judiciary. Serious doubts concerning
the way judges are promoted, rewarded or disciplined will not primarily hurt any
particular judge, but the entire profession. Consequently collective reputation building is
very important for career judges. 37 Such systems tend to emphasize the anonymity of the
law, and the myth that there is a single correct answer for legal questions that in principle
is invariant to the individual judge making the decision.
B. Individual Opinions/Dissents/Voting
The availability of information on the particular judges—be it through the existence of
individual opinions, the possibility of dissent by judges, or the availability of judicial
votes in a transparent and verifiable way that is visible to laymen—has two important
consequences. First, it helps establish an individual reputation for each judge, depending
on the importance of the opinion, the judge’s vote, the opinion-writer’s creativity,
innovation and knowledge, and the extent to which she makes a difference in
jurisprudence. 38 Eventually certain judges may be more likely to side with other judges
who have similar views and interpretations of the law, creating informal coalitions that
allow outsiders to assign labels to specific judges (as liberal, conservative, libertarian,
etc.). Second, individual opinions and dissent help undercut the idea of a homogeneous,
uniform, bureaucratic, noncritical judiciary. Both aspects favor individual over collective
reputation building. 39 This device is enhanced when the judiciary is faced with big public
policy decisions that are controversial or at the centre of intense debate across a society,
such as those involving abortion, gay marriage, segregation, or the welfare state. 40
When individual opinions cannot be recorded and dissent is not allowed, the
judiciary is seen as a homogeneous body, faceless and bureaucratic, in which discussion
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and diversity are replaced with compromise and uniformity. 41 The content of decisions
hurts or enhances the reputation of the judiciary as a whole and not that of a particular
judge. Peer-pressure becomes dominant since decisions must be reached by consensus,
resulting eventually in highly complex language to disguise divergences in the bench and
further reducing the ability of the public to scrutinize opinions. 42
Beyond individual opinions, oral proceedings also offer opportunities for the
cultivation of individual reputation. Oral proceedings allow judges not only to reveal
their legal skills, but also their individual positions and make specific contributions to the
decision taken by the court. They can also communicate to the specialist audience of
lawyers, distinguishing themselves from their colleagues.
Our theory of dissent complements at least one recent account of the practice. In
tracing the history of opinion practices in common law jurisdictions, Professor Todd
Henderson argues that opinion practices reflect the desire of courts to expand their role in
a competitive milieu of norm-articulation. 43 He further argues that those encouraging
dissent have sometimes wanted to use the presence of multiple opinions as a way of
constraining the courts, while others have sought to use dissent to advance judicial
power.
In our view, changes in the overall reputation of the judiciary are the driving force
in changes in common law opinion practice, rather than political views about the relative
power of the judiciary per se. Thus, particular problems with individual or collective
reputation will trigger pressures to move in one direction or the other. For example,
Chief Justice Marshall shifted toward unanimous opinions at a time when the status of the
judiciary was low, in part because seriatim opinions were difficult to understand.
Centralizing opinion practice enhanced collective reputation, and deviation was explicitly
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discouraged. 44 Canon 19 of the ABA's 1924 Canons of Judicial Ethics called on judges
not to “yield to pride of opinion or value more highly his individual reputation than that
of the court to which he should be loyal. Except in cases of conscientious difference of
opinion on fundamental principle, dissenting opinions should be discouraged in courts of
last resort.” 45 Later, Chief Justice Stone presided over a rapid increase in individual
opinions, a practice that continues to this day. 46 Professor Henderson ties this latter shift
to the need to maintain power for the court in an era of legal realism, when formalist
claims to “truth” would not be convincing to relevant audiences. 47 Alternatively, one can
characterize Stone’s encouragement of individual opinions as facilitating investment in
individual reputation at a time when the court contained a diverse set of personalities and
had just avoided collective disaster from Roosevelt’s court-packing plan. Those justices
who fought Roosevelt had put the collective reputation of the entire judiciary at risk; one
can imagine that afterwards, there would be internal pressures within the court to allow
segmenting of reputations to individual authors. This would both ameliorate the new
minority, who could continue to fight and risk only their individual reputations, but also
be good for the new majority supportive of Roosevelt, which could avoid negative
reputational consequences of the minority position. Our account is consistent with those
scholars, such as Professors Post and Guinier, who see the shift in Supreme Court opinion
practices as facilitating new discourses with new audiences. 48
In short, we see the practice of dissent as reflecting alternative institutional
designs to achieve the goal of reputation. Individual opinions will be associated with a
relatively flat organizational structure, in which superior judges have little control over
inferiors. Collective opinions will be associated with the suppression of individual
reputation and the institution of hierarchical controls to overcome collective action
problems in the production of collective reputation. Small wonder, then, that judges who
support the institution of dissent have criticized the alternative model as suppressing
individual conscience. Justice William Brennan, for example, critiqued Chief Justice
Marshall (who strongly pushed for unanimous judicial opinions of the court as a whole)
as trying to “shut down the marketplace of ideas.” 49
In a system that seeks to encourage individual opinions, another possible strategy
is open to judges. Judges can write opinions that follow precedent in terms of the
ultimate decision but seek to develop a new rationale for the decision. In this way, the
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judge can have an impact through their reasoning, even when they decide cases
consistently with case law.
Beyond the possibility of individual opinions, the legal impact of decisions is also
relevant. In the United States, precedent from a higher court generally controls lower
courts, and this provides an incentive for higher court judges to issue clear, well reasoned
decisions that induce lower courts to comply. Within lower courts, however, precedents
do not control. For example, in the United States, federal district court opinions do not
count as precedent within the same district. An individual federal district court judge
need not follow the legal holding of a prior decision in the same district. This device
seems to encourage experimentation in lower courts, and to reward investment in
individual reputation at the expense of collective reputation at the lower court level. At
the same time, the requirement of following superior court precedents means that the
costs to the collective reputation of the judiciary as a whole can be contained. The U.S.
system thus favors individual reputation, with some offsetting devices to ensure some
collective consistency.

C. Sentencing and Procedural Discretion
Discretion in criminal sentencing and in procedural rulings favors individual reputation
over collective reputation by providing yet another way for judges to distinguish
themselves from each other. 50 Reduced discretion in sentencing and in procedure favors
homogeneity across the bench. There are two relevant consequences of this observation.
First, differences in sentencing or in procedure could be exacerbated by judges who are
purely interested in individual reputation building. In other words, the variance in
sentencing or in applying procedural rules could increase significantly if judges focus on
individual rather than collective reputation. Second, if the degree of discretion is higher
with procedure than with substantive sentencing, judges could be tempted to use
procedure to build individual reputation and therefore effectively curtail sentencing rules
or guidelines (e.g., use evidence and other related procedural rules to bias the court one
way or the other). Strict sentencing rules could have very different consequences in a
system in which collective reputation prevails, where such rules would enhance
uniformity and hence reinforce collective reputation, as opposed to a system where
individual reputation is important. In the latter, strict sentencing guidelines might be
undermined by procedural discretion since they limit the ability for individual judges to
be distinct. This account sheds some light on judicial resistance to sentencing guidelines
in the United States. Judges are embedded in a set of structures that encourage
investment in individual reputation. Efforts to constrain their ability to do so, unless
accompanied by much broader institutional reforms, are likely to fail and lead to new
arenas in which judges seek individual reputation.
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In some sense this discussion raises broader themes in legal scholarship of the
distinction between rules and standards. 51 Rules, it is often argued, are useful for
constraining the discretion of individual judges, but are expensive to produce at a
sufficient level of detail. In addition, rules can be over- and under-inclusive, subsuming
within their ambit behavior not intended to be covered by the norm. Standards, on the
other hand, empower the individual judicial decision-maker at the expense of uniformity.
We should expect that the institutional structure of the judiciary will tend to favor rules
when collective reputation is valuable, and standards when individual reputation is
valuable.
D. Appeals
The appeal system and the nature of the relationship between superior and inferior courts
play an important role in shaping incentives to invest in individual versus collective
reputation building. A generous appeal system that essentially allows superior courts to
review and evaluate the decisions taken by inferior courts induces compliance by junior
judges and favor homogeneity and uniformity in decision-making. 52 An appeal system
that imposes few constraints on junior judges gives them more discretion and naturally
generates more heterogeneity in sentencing which favors individual reputation. At the
same time, an appeal system that permits conflicts of jurisdiction and law across courts,
such as the American system which allows for the possibility of circuit splits, disfavors
collective reputation and pushes toward investment in individual reputation. An appeal
system that effectively internalizes potential conflicts and therefore reduces discrepancies
in courts’ decisions contributes decisively to collective reputation.
A crucial dimension on which appeals systems differ is the question of de novo
review. In common law jurisdictions, appeals courts generally only hear questions of
law, leaving the factual record to be developed at the trial level. This is often explained
as originating in the institution of the jury, which finds facts and would have to be
reconvened or reproduced to have de novo review. In contrast, civil law jurisdictions
have de novo review of facts at the higher levels. This involves replication, but also
allows fuller monitoring of junior instances to ensure quality. Our interpretation is that
de novo review is a device to ensure collective reputation, while the lack of such review
encourages individual judges to develop novel interpretations of law and to use their factfinding power toward reputational development.
E. Citations
The use of citations in decisions reflects the importance of individual opinions, and hence
generally contributes to enhancing individual reputation. 53 Citations presuppose that
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some cases and court decisions are path-breaking, not just because the object of the
action is extremely relevant, but because the doctrine and legal interpretation offered by a
given judge is worthy of consideration. Controversial decisions attract attention and
generate debate even when they are not good law. Obviously this means that individual
judges can seek to be identified for a famous case or a notorious decision. The
widespread use of citations clearly favors individual reputation building, particularly
when combined with the institution of individual named opinions.
F. Case Selection
The degree to which the judiciary controls the dockets of courts plays an important role
in the process of establishing reputation. 54 The control of dockets can operate at the
micro level, that is, in choosing particular cases, and at the macro level through such
devices as justiciability doctrines that narrow or expand the scope of judicial review.
When judges cannot effectively influence the cases they hear, collective reputation
operates as a type of insurance, since some judges will randomly be assigned cases that
are more suited for enhancing individual reputation than others through a mechanism that
does not take into account different skill levels across the bench. 55 In other words,
collective reputation reduces the potential reputational damage from being assigned cases
that are detrimental to a particular judge in terms of preferences or skills. When dockets
are effectively controlled by the judiciary itself, case assignment is not longer truly
random. Individual reputation becomes an asset in such a system in two complementary
ways. First, reputation allows individual judges to become favored in the distribution of
cases to be reviewed by the courts relative to other colleagues. Second, reputation allows
further enhancement of individual reputation, by allowing judges to pick cases that are
more appropriate for the relevant constituencies. Case selection is a strategic variable in
preparing the setting for reputation building.
G. Branding
A legal system that allows judges to attach their names to opinions, doctrines,
extrajudicial inquiries, and law reform projects obviously places great value on individual
reputation. For example, in the United Kingdom, judges are frequently called upon to
lead inquiries into government behavior. 56 A legal system in which law reforms are
conducted by bureaucrats and law professors, quasi-judicial inquiries are led by
government officials, and doctrines are developed by law professors does not provide
significant incentives for judges to invest in their individual reputation.
Branding also extends to private sector opportunities after retirement, including
corporate advisory positions, participation in politics, teaching and prestigious
conferences. Clearly individual reputation is more important than collective reputation
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for private sector opportunities after retirement, although a collective reputation for
honesty and transparency could be beneficial from this point of view.
A third important component of branding is a legacy, broadly defined. For
example, judges may be concerned with how they will be cited and discussed in
casebooks, and how their decisions will be vindicated by future generations of judges.
Concern for legacy motivates investment in individual reputation of particular judges,
and less so on the collective reputation of the entire judiciary.
H. Size
The size of the judiciary is important in structuring incentives to invest in reputation. A
larger judiciary raises the cost for each judge to engage in individual reputation building
because there is more competition, and decreases the cost for each judge to engage in
collective reputation building, since the effort required of any individual judge will be
smaller. In a supreme court with nine justices, the actions of a single individual are easily
monitored and assessed by the media in general. In a supreme court of seventy-five
justices, as is not uncommon in the civil law world, only experts can assess the actions of
individual judges, and effective monitoring is limited to other judges or the members of
the high judicial council. Therefore a small judiciary generates investment in individual
reputation and recognition; larger numbers induce uniformity and investment in
collective reputation.
Larger judiciaries also affect incentives in another way: through providing
opportunities for advancement and promotion. If there are relatively few opportunities
for promotion, judges will be less sensitive to pressures from higher levels of the
hierarchy. They may therefore be less willing to sacrifice elements of individual
reputation for the collectivity. In contrast, in a large bureaucratic judiciary, there are
significant opportunities for advancement and judges will be sensitive to the concerns of
their superiors. 57 This design tends to suppress individual variance and lead to greater
investments in collective reputation.
I. Budget and Allocation of Resources
Judges are also the managers of the legal system under very different institutional
arrangements. Management requires resources and a budget. These resources have to be
negotiated with the government, since tax revenues are collected by the government.
Courts may have their own resources from legal fees and other financial instruments, but
these do not typically account for a significant proportion of revenues for the judicial
system. The dependence on the government for resources creates a need for bargaining
with the government, as well as bargaining within the court system for shares of overall
resources.
If resources and the budget, in particular, are allocated to judges as individuals
then individual reputation becomes a major asset in bargaining over resources within the
court system. However, if resources are allocated in a manner that is administratively and
independently of the individual judge, collective reputation becomes a major variable
since only through collective reputation can the judiciary obtain more resources from the
government. As mentioned before, the practice of identical pay for judges of a similar
57
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rank can be viewed as a device to encourage investment in collective over individual
reputation.
J. Other Mechanisms
Other mechanisms that incentivize individual comparisons of judges are elections to
select judges and forum shopping. In judicial elections, each candidate has to present a
distinctive platform to convince the electorate to vote for him or her, heightening
incentives to disassociate the judge from collective reputation, and to brand decisions
with his or her personal stamp. 58 Forum shopping is more complicated, because it
involves the need for a particular court as a whole to associate itself with particular
doctrinal or procedural positions to attract litigants. 59 This requires some investment
collective reputation, but only for the court rather than the judiciary as a whole. The
competition for cases should produce greater variance in decisions across courts,
especially to the extent that the Supreme Court also induces courts. Panels in lower
courts, on the other hand, tend to reduce the possibility of individual evaluation of judges
and so complicate the development of individual reputation.
K. The Interdependence of Institutional Choices
The above institutions are conceptually distinct from each other. Crucially, however,
they are reinforcing in terms of reputation and provision of information about
performance. The common law tendency toward a “recognition” judiciary is based on
judges who are selected because their earlier investments in reputation allow ex ante
screening for quality and effort. Such judges can be trusted to write high quality
individual opinions. In contrast, the “career” system associated with the civil law hires
judges at a young age, and therefore cannot trust them to adequately invest in individual
reputation without extensive monitoring. Hence we see collective opinions. Citations are
also less important, as the identity of any individual judge is usually not known.
Branding is frowned upon.
The career system also requires many more judges, because monitoring output at
the lowest level requires an intermediate supervisory level (itself an autonomous body or
a different layer of a more hierarchical court system). Appeal is essential to maintain
quality and discourage shirking. Appeals are de novo, in order to ensure that individual
judges do not harm the collective reputation of the judiciary. We thus observe much
larger judiciaries to accomplish de novo review. This reinforces the notion of team rather
than individual production, and reduces the amount of effort required by any single judge
to produce reputation.
We also see differences in the discretion over dockets in the two systems. The
judges in recognition systems have a variety of devices to exercise docket control,
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particularly at the senior levels. This allows them to control their policy-making role. In
contrast, career judges are viewed as relatively low level functionaries without individual
discretion.
It is interesting to think about the ideology of the common law and civil law as
reinforcing these institutional features. It is generally understood that the civil law
tradition conceives of “the law” as a unified coherent whole, with pre-existing answers to
legal questions that are identifiable through the exercise of legal science. 60 This idea deemphasizes the role of the individual judge in crafting the law, and in principle different
judges are not thought to be able to arrive at different answers to legal questions. In
contrast, common law judiciaries tend to see law as more akin to policy. Policy matters
are those which in principle reasonable minds can disagree. This is not to suggest that
law is infinitely plastic, but rather that for hard legal questions (of the type most likely to
be litigated) different judges may come up with different answers. Seeing law as policy
means that we need to identify the particular reasoning and to associate it with an
individual judge. These different conceptions of the law obviously track the distinction
between collective and individual reputation.
V. AN ILLUSTRATION: THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN
By way of illustration, contrast the U.S. Federal judiciary with that of Japan. We
take these two countries to represent ideal-typical poles in the organization of judiciaries,
and hence use them to illustrate the argument. 61 The United States is a classic example of
a “recognition” judiciary, in which judges are appointed to the bench in large part
because of individual accomplishments in other spheres. They are known as superior
individuals who have already developed a certain amount of reputation; indeed, the
collective reputation of the judiciary may in part derive from achievements in other
spheres. An extreme case was former President Taft, who subsequently became Chief
Justice. Individual judges in the United States sit alone at trial level, and do not move
courts, unless they are lucky enough to be appointed to a higher level. At the appellate
level judges frequently write their own dissenting and concurring opinions. A vigorous
citation practice encourages this individuation of opinions.
Individual judges have a good deal of discretion. At the trial level,
notwithstanding efforts to develop sentencing guidelines, judges retain a good deal of
control over the procedure. The appellate system is limited to questions of law, meaning
that the system tolerates a good deal of diversity both across first-instance courts and
across regions of the country. Lawyers, of course, know this, and so sometimes seek to
forum shop to obtain a favorable venue; less formally, most lawyers will have strong
views about the character of individual justices at the appellate level.
The limited appellate system means that a relatively small judiciary is tolerable.
The United States has one of the lowest ratios of judges to lawyers in the world. 62 This
in turn enhances the prestige of those lawyers who actually do make it onto the bench.
60

Merryman and Pérez-Perdomo above n 34.

61

More examples are discussed in detail by Garoupa N and Ginsburg T 2009 ‘Judicial Reputation and
Audiences: Perspectives from Comparative Law’, 47 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 451.

62

See Posner above n 36.

Garoupa and Ginsburg, Reputation p. 25
Judges are generalist wise men and women, and many of them develop a reputation as
judicial statesmen or public intellectuals. Supreme Court cases are routinely front-page
news, and scrutinized by the chattering classes for their public policy implications. Many
judges become heroes, and their names live on in history. This is a system that greatly
values individual reputation.
Contrast all this with the Japanese judiciary. Japanese judges enter the judiciary
at a young age and spend their career in a hierarchical structure. They will spend their
career in a series of two- and three-year rotations, moving around the country and so
unable to be identified with any particular court location. 63 Opinions are unsigned at all
levels save the Supreme Court and dissenting opinions are rare. Japanese Supreme Court
decisions are rarely front page news, and even many lawyers cannot name the justices of
the Court. Decisions at the lower level are unsigned and so the judge is essentially
faceless, reflecting the civil law ideology that the decision reflects the law rather than
views of any particular judge. The judiciary as a whole has a reputation for quality and
predictability, but individual judges have no reputation at all. 64
The ideology of judging is such that judges are seen as having no independent
influence on case outcomes, and there is a theoretical correct answer for every case.
Indeed, in some cases the judge will be replaced because of the rotation system, with no
concern for problems that may cause. 65 There are also internal systems for uniformity,
including tables of formulae for damage awards, so that like cases will be treated alike
regardless of the judge hearing the case. The rotation system also provides for
suppression of discretion: judges who are outliers can and will suffer in terms of being
assigned to undesirable locations. 66 This can be seen as a device for ensuring that
individuals contribute to collective reputation, and that an overall reputation for
uniformity is maintained.
A major scholarly debate concerns whether or not the Japanese judiciary is
independent. 67 Professor Ramseyer and co-authors have emphasized the ability of the
Supreme Court Secretariat to discipline judges at lower levels. Because the Secretariat is
appointed by the Supreme Court itself, the Supreme Court is appointed by the Diet, and
the Diet has been controlled by a single political party for most of the last six decades,
Ramseyer argues that judges are ultimately subject to external control. 68 He provides
evidence that judges who ruled against the interests of the ruling Liberal Democratic
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Party have suffered career sanction. This account emphasizes a particular external
audience for the courts that operates at the individual level.
Professor Haley, by contrast, emphasizes the internal audience and the collective
quality of the judiciary. 69 Japanese judges work in a hierarchy that is similar to that of
other large Japanese organizations, in which one enters the organization at a young age
and spends ones whole career in the same institution. For all large organizations, internal
controls help to socialize staff. The emphasis is on mechanisms of collective reputation,
in which Japanese judges are evaluated by society only on a collective basis. Haley
points to the relative rarity of sanctions, the complete absence of reported instances of
judicial corruption, and strong corporate identity of the judiciary to argue that the
Japanese judiciary is indeed quite independent.
Our concern is not with independence per se. Much of the debate between Haley
and Ramseyer turns on one’s conception of judicial independence and whether it inheres
in the individual judge or the judiciary as a whole. From our perspective, the key question
is what audience the judiciary is addressing in its decision-making. Even if Professor
Ramseyer is correct (and we find his evidence convincing) it does not explain judicial
decision-making in the vast majority of cases which have low political salience. For
these cases, internal audiences are indeed the most important. Certainly, when compared
with a judiciary such as that of the United States, Japan’s institutional structures lean
heavily toward collective reputation.
This situation has begun to change slightly. In the late 1990s, after several years
of economic malaise, Japan’s elites initiated a major program of legal reform,
culminating in the creation of a Justice System Reform Council in 1999. The Council
issued its report two years later and was quite critical of the judiciary for maintaining a
detached stance toward society, and being insufficiently transparent. 70 It called for
increasing the number of appointments from the ranks of practicing lawyers. Though the
number of such appointees remains low so far, this has the potential to introduce new
incentives for judges to focus on the legal profession as a relevant audience. Another
recommendation focused on allowing citizens some role in the reappointment of judges.
This is required for Supreme Court justices every ten years under Japan’s Constitution,
though in practice this is never utilized because judges are appointed to the Supreme
Court relatively close to the retirement age. 71 In 2003, an eleven-member Advisory
Committee for the Nomination of Judges was established, five of whom are “insiders”
(judges, prosecutors or lawyers) and the remaining six from academia and the general
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publlc. The Committee has already rejected some propoed candidates on the basis of its
own investigations. 72
Perhaps even more radically, the JSRC recommended the introduction of a quasijury system, in which citizens will sit in a mixed panel with judges in serious criminal
cases. This reform, while not demanded by the public, was seen as an important step
toward improving the transparency and legitimacy of the justice sytem as a whole. As a
result, from August of 2009, ordinary citizens began to sit as saiban-in, lay decisionmakers, deciding serious criminal cases. 73 One can view this development as seeking to
force the judiciary to make its decisions more transparent to the ordinary citizen,
reflecting a shift from internal toward external audiences for judges. One also observes
increased coverage of legal cases in newspapers, and even criticism of some decisions in
public. Still, the core institutions of the career judiciary have remained in place, and the
shift is only a matter of degree.
VI. DISCUSSION: LESSONS FOR REFORM
Our basic argument is that institutional structures will incentivize investment in either
individual or collective reputation in different degrees. These incentives respond to the
needs for individual and collective performance information as perceived in each legal
system. An ideal structure will provide sufficient incentives to invest in both individual
and collective reputation, and we believe that systems that stray too far in one direction
will not be able to deliver efficient, neutral justice. In fact, when too little of one type of
information is provided or made available, legal reforms might try to provide incentives
to reverse the situation.
This argument has implications for judicial reform programs. Above all, our
analysis suggests caution in introducing reforms, as the linked nature of many institutions
that affect reputation mean that change in one can have unanticipated effects in other
institutions. Still some reforms might be feasible and appropriate. We consider first
proposed reforms that are designed to induce more investment in individual reputation
and then reforms designed to enhance collective reputation.
A. Reforms to Induce Greater Individual Effort
1. Variable Pay
We wonder if there might not be greater scope for introducing variable
compensation for judges based on performance. In an ideal world, we would compensate
judges for their marginal contribution to judicial reputation, which would require some
proxy for individual judicial performance. There are however three substantive problems
that need to be considered, some of them already detected in Part III. First, individual
performance measures might disrupt team work and raise agency costs, that is, given the
existence of a non-separable component, it might not be possible to approximate the
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individual marginal contribution. Second, inadequate individual performance measures
might distort activities, hence generating strategic adjustments by the judiciary in order to
boost the potential gains. For example, we might see judges invest insufficient time in
hard cases, or seek to hear only easy ones. Finally, there might be a crowding-out effect
between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. Many professional norms among the judiciary
(regarding, for example, judiciousness and precedent) are established by prestige and
status, and they could be undermined by the introduction of high powered market
incentives that result in differential pay. 74
Fee for service has some history in the common law. Until 1799, judges in the
English monarchical courts were paid a salary and also were allowed to charge fees that
ranged from 8 to over 54% of total judicial income. 75 Professor Klerman has argued that
these fee for service arrangements facilitated competition among judges and among
courts to produce quality rules, particularly those that favored plaintiffs. 76 There is some
evidence that courts with institutional structures that concentrated authority were better
able to produce innovative rules in this process of competition. 77 The English system thus
seems to have provided some incentive for both individual and collective reputation.
The system, however, was controversial in the United States. 78 Though fee for
service arrangements were common in colonial America, there was concern about the
potential for judicial corruption and many state constitutions banned the practice.79
Article III of the U.S. Constitution seems to frown upon, and probably ban, the practice
for federal judges, referring as it does to payment for services “at stated Times.” 80 The
Judiciary Act provides for salaries rather than fees, and when one early district court
judge insisted on charging fees for admiralty cases, the Congress responded by
forbidding the practice. 81 In short, the US experience has shied away from fees for
ordinary judges. Specialized courts and some lower level magistrates, however, have
received variable pay. For example, bankruptcy judges were paid by size of case till
1890s.
The only such modern effort of which we are aware was in Spain. A
controversial law allowed for the possibility of performance based salaries for the
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judiciary (Ley 15/2003). The judicial council (Consejo General del Poder Judicial)
implemented that new system of compensation in 2004 (Reglamento 2/2003) but the
Spanish Supreme Court nullified it in March of 2006 (Sentencia de la Sala de lo
Contencioso Administrativo 17/2004). Aside from procedural issues, the substantive
arguments provided by the Supreme Court included that the estimation of individual
productivity is contrary to the very nature of judicial activity and the work of the
judiciary is not compatible with quantitative assessments of productivity. We view this
decision as privileging collective reputation over individual reputation. 82
Presumably, in theory, adequate performance measures should be able to avoid all
these shortcomings (minimizing the costs of disrupting team work, deterring strategic
inefficient substitution of activities, and avoiding crowding-out effects with intrinsic
motivation), but it might be unfeasible for practical purposes to develop such measures.
Furthermore, the most obvious performance measures as embraced by the Spanish legal
policymakers are likely to be insufficient and even detrimental. Compensation based on
the number of cases or the speed of case disposition is likely to induce judges to spend
too little time on cases, and to seek to avoid complex cases. Using productivity in terms
of the number of pages drafted is likely to lead to wordy opinions that are too long. In
conclusion, although ideal individual performance measures would be the optimal
instrument to improve individual reputation from an economic perspective, we are quite
skeptical that such devices can be utilized effectively. Still, we encourage scholars to
consider workable proxies for judicial performance that might facilitate the creation of
new incentive structures for judiciaries. 83
2 .Transparency
Another reform that may be workable is to introduce transparency into the
operations of the judiciary. Simply informing the public of the judges who sit in a
particular case will induce marginal investment into individual reputation while
encouraging accountability. Currently, information is hard to come by, particularly in
many developing countries. Judicial councils and ministries of justice provide
information in some systems.
One idea here is to encourage competing sources of information. There would be
some cost in terms of duplication but there may also be corresponding benefits in
accuracy. In many developing countries, non-governmental “judicial watch” programs
have been established, often with the help of foreign donors. The thought is that the
judiciary, like any other administrative agent, requires monitoring. Because of concerns
about judicial independence, hiring another state agency to watch the courts seems
inappropriate and so civil society can play a role in watching individual cases (as can the
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media.) If working well, this tends to enhance investment in both individual and
collective reputation.
Forum-shopping could be another interesting way to pursue individual reputation.
It naturally introduces competition among courts which puts pressure on judges to build
individual reputation in order to attract litigants.
B. Reforms to Induce Greater Collective Effort
Unlike individual reputation, investment in collective reputation requires
collective action on the part of the judiciary as a whole. When senior judges have a
supervisory role, they may be the focus of reform efforts. How might the senior
managers of the judiciary be induced to foster higher levels of investment in collective
reputation?
1. Ratings systems
In recent years there have been a plethora of “ratings” systems, measuring various
qualities of interest across countries and ranking them accordingly. Examples include the
World Competitiveness Report, Transparency International’s Corruption Reports, the
World Bank’s Governance Indicators, to name a few. These systems have been the target
of much critique, both methodologically and substantively. 84 Nevertheless, there is some
evidence that countries take them seriously. 85
Cross-national ratings such as the World Bank’s Rule of Law Measure can induce
the managers of the judiciary to ensure that there is sufficient investment into collective
reputation. Because the managers ultimately work for the public, high profile ratings can
capture public attention and lead to pressures on the managers to improve performance.
It can also motivate the government to expend resources on the judiciary, empowering
judges in the internal competition for funds. It should be recognized, though, that any
simple metric risks inducing new pathologies into the system as managers and judges try
to game the system. Suppose, for example, that a cross-national metric of time to
disposition is used to rank judiciaries, just as the World Bank’s Doing Business Report
measures administrative procedures required to set up a firm. This could lead to an
emphasis on speed over quality, which might in turn hinder the overall reputation of the
judiciary.
2. Random De Novo Appeal
As we have seen, systems with de novo appeal tend to have a greater emphasis on
collective reputation than those without such appeals. This might lead one to propose an
expansion of de novo appeal as a way of ensuring judicial quality. The problem is that de
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novo appeal is expensive, and many judiciaries that do not allow it also have a relatively
small number of judges.
One way to obtain the benefits of de novo appeal without incurring all the costs
would be to use a randomization method to draw a certain number of cases into a de novo
review. If trial judges know that there is some chance that their fact-finding would be
reviewed in detail, this might induce them to invest more resources into individual cases,
which presumably would enhance the overall quality of fact-finding. The number of de
novo appeals could be calibrated to balance the marginal cost against the marginal
deterrence benefit in heightened quality. We know of no system which utilizes random
audit methods for reviewing judicial cases, but it seems an elementary innovation, with
potential beneficial effects in countering corruption as well as producing more careful
decisions.
VII. CONCLUSION
Judicial reputation matters. It provides information about performance and indirectly
affects judicial resources and power. As of yet, however, we do not have a complete
understanding of the determinants of reputation. This paper has used law and economics
tools to understand investment in reputation as a problem of team production. Judiciaries
require individual effort by judges, but it is difficult to observe any particular judge’s
contribution to overall performance. Furthermore, judges who are concerned only with
their own reputation might undermine collective judicial reputation. On the other hand,
too much emphasis on collective reputation might lead judges to shirk, producing lower
quality justice.
This framework helps us to understand the inner workings of judicial systems. We
have identified a set of particular institutional choices, roughly but not perfectly
corresponding to the distinction between common law and civil law systems, that provide
the incentives structure for judges. We believe that these institutional choices are linked
and, in the aggregate, determine the particular texture of judicial reputation. Crucially,
legal systems can experience pathologies when institutional reforms skew investment
incentives in one direction or another.
As a normative matter, designers of judicial systems need to think about
incentives for reputation building, which will enhance to the various outputs expected
from the judiciary. Our particular proposals are intended to be suggestive, but we believe
that we have identified the right level of analysis to characterize national patterns in a
more refined way.
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